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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(j) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1.

Did the trial court err in modifying the arbitrator's award in favor of

Appellant Dixon Wong ("Wong") to conform to the $100,000 underinsured motorist
policy limit? "In reviewing the order of the district court confirming, vacating, or
modifying an arbitration award, we grant no deference to the court's conclusions of law,
reviewing them for correctness. We review the district court's findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard. More specifically, our 'scope of review is limited to the legal
issue of whether the trial court correctly exercised its authority in confirming, vacating, or
modifying an arbitration award.'" Softsolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 2000
UT 46, T[12, 1 P.3d 1095 (quoting Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pac. R.R. Co..
961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998)).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wong appeals from an order of the Third District Court in favor of Allstate
Insurance Company (Allstate), Wong's underinsured motorist carrier, which corrected an
1

arbitrator's underinsured motorist case award to conform to the relevant insurance policy
limits of $100,000.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Wong was injured in an automobile accident on June 1, 2001 at or near
8400 South and State Street, Sandy, Utah. (R.at 6) Wong subsequently recovered
$50,000 from the at fault driver's liability insurance coverage and Wong's own PIP
coverage. (R. at 6,13-14,142) Believing his damages to be in excess of the third party's
liability coverage, Wong made a claim to Allstate to recover additional damages under his
Underinsured Motorist Policy (the UIM Policy). (R. at 6,142) Wong's UIM Policy has a
contractual recovery limit of $100,000 per person. (R. at 22,142) (Allstate established
the UIM policy limits at the district court via affidavit and the policy declarations sheet,
which were undisputed. (R. at 13-14,19-25)) Allstate disagreed with the amount of
damages claimed by Wong under the UIM Policy. (R. at 6)
In order to resolve the dispute, the parties agreed to submit the matter to an
arbitrator. As part of the arbitration process, the parties signed two documents: (1) an
Arbitration Agreement (R. at 16-17); and (2) a Binding Arbitration Agreement with
Warren W. Driggs, the arbitrator. (R at 18) The Arbitration Agreement contains a clause
referring to a "high/low" arrangement. (R. at 16). Wong's attorney (Preston Handy)
2

crossed out that portion of the agreement. (R. at 16). The remaining portion of the
high/low arrangement, pertaining to disclosure of terms, was not crossed out, but rather
was left as part of the agreement. (R. at 16). Counsel for both parties (Mr. Handy for
Wong and Len McGee for Allstate) signed the agreement. (R. at 17) Additionally, both
parties signed a Binding Arbitration Agreement which listed the nature of the matter
submitted for arbitration as "Underinsured Motorist Claim-Damages." (R. at 18) As a
result, both parties and the arbitrator knew this to be an arbitration of a contract claim.
(R. at 18)
On May 14, 2002, Mr. Handy sent a letter discussing the nature of the
upcoming arbitration. (R. at 57) The relevant portion of the letter states:
This letter is a follow-up to our recent conversation
this morning regarding my client, Dixon Wong, and the
upcoming arbitration. I want to confirm that our agreement
pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement is that this matter will
be arbitrated with no consideration for a binding high/low
agreement. This is evidenced by the Arbitration Agreement
signed by you well after the amendments/changes were made.
Furthermore, it is important to note that nothing in Mr.
Wong's contract of insurance with Allstate requires that he be
bound by a high/low agreement.
We have agreed that the arbitrator will not be made
aware of either the terms of the Arbitration Agreement or the
policy limits under the subject policy. In short, the arbitrator
will be afforded the opportunity to award what he believes
Mr. Wong's claim is worth, whatever that figure may be.
3

(R. at 57). Upon receiving this letter, Mr. McGee responded the next day with a letter
stating:
I agree with you that there is not a high/low agreement
in place regarding the upcoming arbitration in this matter;
however, it is Allstate Insurance Company's position (as it
has been from the beginning of this case) that Mr. Wong is
still bound by the $100,000.00 contractual limit of his
insurance policy, notwithstanding whatever amount the
arbitrator may award.
(R. at 58) No further correspondence was sent on this issue, and the parties went to
arbitration the next day.
On May 16, 2002, an arbitration hearing was held before Warren Driggs.
(R. at 6, 26) Neither party introduced the UIM contract providing the basis for the
arbitration, nor the policy limits, and the arbitrator did not inquire about the limit of his
authority under the contract. On May 20, 2002, Mr. Driggs issued the Arbitration Award.
(R. at 26-28) Mr. Driggs determined that Wong suffered damages in the amount of
$321,616.84 as a result of the June 1, 2001 accident. (R. at 26-28) Mr. Driggs then used
that amount as the beginning basis for his arbitration award, reduced that amount by the
liability and PIP benefits previously paid to Mr. Wong, and entered net "award" of
$260,926.84 in damages. (R. at 26-28) As reflected by the Arbitration Award, Mr.
Driggs did not establish the amount of the UIM Policy limits nor tie his award to those
4

limits, but simply entered an "award" based on the total amount of damages that he
determined Mr. Wong to have suffered. (R. at 26-28) After Wong refused to accept the
maximum contract amount, i.e., the policy limit of $100,000, Allstate filed a Motion to
Vacate Arbitrator's Award, or in the Alternative, Motion for Modification of Arbitrator's
Award, in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah on June 10, 2002. (R. at 1-28)
The district court heard oral argument on Allstate's motion on October 31,
2002. (R. at 156) The district court ruled in favor of Allstate and corrected the
arbitration award down to the policy limits. (R. at 15, pp.24-26) In reaching this
determination, the court stated:
[T]he suggestion that entering into an arbitration
matter somehow opened the door to an unlimited claim, I find
just [to be] outside of the scope of the relationship of the
parties or any reasonable expectation.
It seemed to me that in looking at the language of the
statute, that both the provision that allows the Court to vacate
or modify on the basis of the arbitrator's exceeding the
power-its power, or exceeding its authority, and going beyond
what is within reason or with fact, those sustain the Court's
decision.
Policy limits are the contractual determinations of the
parties as to what they are being insured against, and the
suggestion that somehow this is changed by submitting the
matter to arbitration without advising the arbitrator of that
limit to me just does not make any sense in logic or reason. It
would be something that an insurance company would be

5

giving up without any basis. It just doesn't make any sense to
this Court.
It seems to me there might-may be reasons to enter
into an arbitration without advising the arbitrator of the
parameters of the relationship of the parties, simply to insure
the arbitrator had an opportunity to deal with the issues with
objectivity, without being influenced by any numbers, and it
seems to me that that may be the basis for the arbitration
agreement framed as it was, without the terms more
specifically identified.
My suspicion is that in the future that will not be the
case, but in this case it seems to me clear that that contractual
amount, that policy limit, define[s] the outer limits of the
insurance coverage offered.
(R at 156, pp.25-26)
On December 16, 2002, the district court entered an Order Granting
Petitioner's Motion to Modify Arbitrator's Award. Of relevance, the Order provides that
the underinsured motorist policy constitutes a contract, and
that the policy limits of $ 100,000 define the outer extent of
exposure to petitioner, Allstate Insurance Company, on a
claim for underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration
award in excess of the $100,000 policy limits was beyond the
reasonable expectation of the parties. The Arbitation
Agreement did not operate to open or modify the terms of the
insurance contract.
(R. at 142-43) The court further held that in accordance with case law and statutes, "the
arbitrator exceeded his authority and power by entering an award in excess of $100,000,
that the award is beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties, and that the award
6

lacks adequate foundation in reason or fact." (R. at 143) Finally, the Order provided that
"the insurance policy limits of $100,000 constitute a contractual determination of the
parties, which are not modified or altered by virtue of the arbitration agreements." (R. at
143) On January 8, 2003, Wong filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. at 149-150)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
This matter is a contract case wherein the parties have entered into a series
of agreements which established the parties' mutual obligations and expectations. On
appeal, Wong seeks to avoid the plain language and limitations imposed by his insurance
policy with Allstate, and to enforce an arbitration "award" that exceeded the policy
limits.. Against this background, Wong argues Allstate waived its contractual rights
(albeit without reason or consideration), the district court considered improper extrinsic
evidence (the UIM contract itself) and the arbitrator's award was proper (notwithstanding
its disregard of the contract being arbitrated). The district court recognized the parties'
contractual agreements set the limits of any award and then modified the award to
conform with these expectations.
In opposition to Wong's arguments, Allstate asserts the parties' contracts
and agreements to support the district court's actions. Specifically, Wong is estopped
from arguing Allstate has waived its right to assert policy limits. The parties entered into
7

an arbitration agreement providing that the terms of the arbitration agreement itself would
not be revealed to the arbitrator during the arbitration. Both attorneys treated this
provision as disallowing them from introducing evidence of the policy limits, with Mr.
McGee/Allstate holding to the axiomatic proposition that if the arbitrator's determination
of damages exceeded policy limits then policy limits would be owed. Mr. Handy/Wong,
on the other hand, insisted that the arbitrator be kept in the dark about the UIM limits and
hoped to take advantage, unfairly and without consideration, of any resulting confusion.
Any argument that Allstate waived its right to assert the policy limit by not introducing it
at arbitration is invalidated by these circumstances and the doctrine of unclean hands.
Additionally, the matter that the parties agreed to arbitrate was "Underinsured Motorist
Coverage-Damages." Because the underinsured motorist contract clearly, unequivocally
and indissputably limits Wong's recovery to $100,000.00, the district court properly
found the arbitrator exceeded his authority and the award had no basis in fact.
Additionally, Wong has waived his right to contest the evidence. Finally, Wong is not
entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

8

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY MODIFIED THE ARBITRATOR'S
AWARD TO CONFORM TO THE UNDERINSURED POLICY LIMITS OF
$100,000.
In modifying the arbitration award, the district court recognized the

arbitration award exceeded the parties' contractual obligations, exceeded the arbitrator's
authority and was not based in reason or fact. Wong contends on appeal that the district
court improperly modified the arbitrator's award. Given the parties' agreements and the
facts of the arbitration, the district court's decision was proper for three reasons: (A)
Allstate did not waive its right to assert the policy limits because the parties agreed not to
introduce this evidence at arbitration and Wong has unclean hands in attempting to take
advantage of confusion that he and his counsel created; (B) the Arbitration Act and case
law support the district court's order modifying the award; and (C) Wong has waived his
right to object to "extrinsic" evidence introduced to the district court. For these reasons,
the district court properly modified the arbitrator's award to conform to the underinsured
policy limits, and Wong is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and other expenses.
Accordingly, this court should affirm the district court's order granting Allstate's Motion
to Modify Arbitrator's Award.

9

A.

Allstate Did Not Waive Its Right to Limit the Arbitrator's Award to
the Contractual Limits of $100,000,
Wong first contends that Allstate waived its right to assert policy limitations

of $100,000. Specifically, Wong argues that Allstate could have either included language
in the Arbitration Agreement limiting the award or it could have submitted the policy and
its limits to the arbitrator, and that by not doing so, it waived its right to limit the award.
It is undisputed, however, that both parties knew they were arbitrating a UIM claim. The
arbitration agreements made almost no effort to identify the subject matter of the
arbitration, but were focused on the procedural elements of the arbitration. Nevertheless,
Mr. Driggs' agreement did identify the nature of the dispute as an underinsured motorist
claim.
First, it is curious that Wong would assert that Allstate waived enforcement
of the policy limits by not introducing the policy limits, when it was Wong's counsel who
insisted in correspondence that the parties had agreed that the policy limits not be
disclosed. (R. at 16-17, 57, 58). Specifically, the non-disclosure provision of the
arbitration agreement was left in the agreement by Wong. Subsequently, the intent of the
non-disclosure provision was discussed and reaffirmed by the parties immediately prior to
the arbitration. The doctrines of unclean hands and equitable estoppel preclude a party
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from inducing an action (or inaction) and then benefitting from that action or inaction.
See Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services, Inc.. 1999 UT 100, Tf34, 989 P.2d 1077 (setting
forth elements of equitable estoppel). As part of counsel's communications before
arbitration, Wong insisted that Allstate not disclose the policy limits at arbitration. Wong
cannot benefit from Allstate's honoring the parties' agreement by now arguing that
Allstate was required to assert policy limits at arbitration. Wong is estopped from arguing
that Allstate was required to introduce the policy at arbitration in light of the parties'
agreement.
Next, Allstate's concession not to enter into a high/low agreement has no
impact on its ability to assert the policy limits of the contract with its insured. A high/low
agreement is distinct from policy limits, and a high ($100,000)/low ($0) provision, taken
from a form normally used in third party liability arbitrations, was actually unnecessary
under the circumstances. As the May 14 letter from Wong's counsel contemplates, Wong
recognized the high/low agreement was distinct from the policy limits. In the letter,
Wong's counsel first states that the parties have agreed not to enter into a high/low
agreement and, as a matter of fact, "nothing in Mr. Wong's contract of insurance with
Allstate requires that he be bound by a high/low agreement." (R. at 57). The letter goes
on to state that "the arbitrator will not be made aware of either the terms of the
11

Arbitration Agreement or the policy limits under the subject policy." (R. at 57)
(emphasis added). To the extent the next line of the letter suggested that Mr. Wong was
entitled to recover more than his policy limits, Allstate sent a letter reaffirming its
position that regardless of the arbitrator's award, Wong could only recover up to his
policy limits. (R. at 58).
After receiving this letter, Wong did not reply or indicate any dispute with
Allstate's position that Wong could only recover up to his policy limits. On this point, a
couple of other factors are worth discussing. First, high/low agreements are born out of
third party claims where no contractual limitations exist on a third party's right to recover
against a tortfeasor. In the case of a third party's claim against insured driver, any award
to the third party above the insured's policy limit would be recoverable from the insured's
personal assets. In this context, and because nearly all insurance claims against
individuals are fortunately resolved within policy limits, insurance companies and their
insureds will almost never enter into a binding arbitration where the insured faces any risk
of having an excess judgment awarded against her/him. To remedy this problem, but to
allow ADR to serve its useful purpose, these arbitration agreements typically contain a
high/low provision setting the high as the insured's policy limit. The quid pro quo for
capping the high was to set the low at some reasonable amount to guarantee some
12

recovery to the third party. The important fact of the high/low agreement is that both
parties receive a benefit from entering into that agreement.
Because parties frequently use the same arbitration agreements in the
context of a first party underinsured (UIM) or uninsured (UM) policy context, a carryover high/low agreement might well be set at policy limits/$0, in this case $100,000/$0.
In a first party UIM or UM arbitration, neither party receives any benefit from the
agreement or gives up anything by such a provision. It serves simply as reaffirmation of
what the recovery parameters could be-nothing or up to policy limits and is therefor
meaningless. Reading the lack of a high/low agreement as Wong requests defies logic.
Allstate received nothing-no consideration-for agreeing not to include or disclose a
high/low agreement1.
Allstate had no incentive, financial or otherwise, to agree that policy limits
would not apply to the arbitrator's determination of damages. To do so would be, as the
district court recognized, "something that an insurance company would be giving up
without any basis." (R. at 156, p.25) Mr. McGee, Allstate's counsel, undoubtedly agreed
1

Contrary to Wong's assertion, Allstate did not face any bad faith claims by
contesting the extent of Wong's injuries and his right to recover the full amount of his
UIM coverage, and there is absolutely no proof in the record to support that bare and
baseless contention. Simply stated, Allstate had no reason to agree to allow Wong to
recover in excess of his policy limits at arbitration.
13

to Mr. Handy5 s lining out of the high/low provision of the Arbitration Agreement because
it was meaningless-there was already a cap on the potential award due to the UIM Policy
limit and $0 was of course the least that Mr. Wong could receive. In other words,
because this was a contract-based claim, an automatic ceiling already existed on the
amount to which Wong could eventually be entitled.
Furthermore, Allstate agreed not to disclose the policy limits to the
arbitrator. By not disclosing the policy limits, some parties to the arbitration feel the
arbitrator is able to make a proper determination of the value of the personal injury
without feeling constrained by the policy limits. In fact, the district court recognized this
in making its ruling by stating:
It seems to me there might - may be reasons to enter into an
arbitration without advising the arbitrator of the parameters of
the relationship of the parties, simply to insure the arbitrator
had an opportunity to deal with the issues with objectivity,
without being influenced by any numbers, and it seems to me
that that may be the basis for the arbitration agreement framed
as it was, without the terms more specifically identified.
(R. at 156, pp.25-26) Again, the contractual limitations had not been lifted simply
because the parties decided to enter into arbitration. See Tellkamp v. Wolverine Mut. Ins.
Co., 556 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. App. 1996) (providing that agreement not to inform
arbitrator of policy limits for uninsured motorist coverage did not amount to a waiver of
14

those limits); Brijmohan v. State Farm Ins. Coverage, 239 A.2d 496, 497 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (providing that insurer did not waive its objection that arbitrator exceeded his
power by waiting to assert objection until opposing confirmation of award).
B.

Because the Arbitration Award Exceeded the Parties9 Expectations
and Was Contrary to the Parties9 Contractual Relationship, the
District Court Properly Modified the Arbitration Award to Conform to
Applicable Insurance Policy.
The district court recognized that modification of the arbitration award to

conform to the policy limits was required. Utah law, and the majority of other states,
support the district court's conclusions.
For purposes of applying the case law, the salient facts are as follows.
Allstate and Wong entered into a contract whereby Allstate provided an automobile
insurance policy to Wong. In exchange for this coverage, Wong paid a specified
premium for the level of coverage he selected. Wong's UIM coverage was limited to
$100,000.00 per person. After Wong settled with the liable third party, Wong made a
demand to Allstate under his UIM policy. As Allstate is entitled to do, it contested the
extent of Wong's injuries and his right to recover the full extent of his policy. The parties
agreed to submit to binding arbitration Wong's right to recover under his UIM policy.

15

As part of this process, the parties executed two agreements. The first
agreement, the Arbitration Agreement, had the high/low provision crossed-out, kept the
non-disclosure provision in place, and was silent as to the policy limits and the exact
subject matter to be submitted to arbitration (although the parties' correspondence and the
circumstances make it clear that they were arbitrating a UIM claim). The second
agreement, the Binding Arbitration Agreement, specified the matter to be arbitrated as
"Underinsured Motorist Claim-Damages." Prior to arbitration, the parties clarified the
agreement through correspondence and agreed not to disclose the policy or its limits to
the arbitrator. At this time, Allstate reaffirmed the obvious that Wong's recovery was
limited to the policy limits regardless of the arbitrator's award. The matter was arbitrated,
and pursuant to the agreement, neither the Arbitration Agreement, the policy nor its limits
were introduced in evidence. The arbitrator entered an award for Wong in excess of his
UIM policy limits. Allstate immediately tendered the full amount of Wong's policy,
which he rejected. Based on his rejection, Allstate timely filed this action to modify the
arbitration award.
The Utah Arbitration Act, 78-31 a-1 to-20 (2002) (the Act), governs the
arbitration process. Generally, arbitration awards should be left intact if "the proceeding
was fair and honest and the substantial rights of the parties were respected." Buzas
16

Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1996) (citations
omitted). The district courts may review arbitration awards if necessary, but "judicial
review of arbitration awards confirmed pursuant to the Act is limited to those grounds and
procedures provided for under the Act." Soft Solutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young
University. 2000 UT 46,1fl4, 1 P.3d 1095.
Under the Act, a court may vacate or modify an award for a number of
reasons. As it relates to this case, Utah Code Ann. §78-3la-14 provides that upon motion
by any party, the court must vacate an arbitration award if it appears that "the arbitrators
exceeded their powers." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-14(l)(c) (2002)). "For a court
reviewing an arbitration award to determine that an arbitrator exceeded his authority, a
court must (1) review the submission agreement and determine that the 'arbitrator's
award covers areas not contemplated by the submission agreement,5 or (2) determine that
an award is "'without foundation in reason or fact."'" Soft Solutions. Inc.. 2000 UT 46 at
f 15 (internal quotations omitted). In addition, the Act requires a court to modify an
arbitration award if it appears that "the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not
submitted to them, if the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of the award
upon the issues submitted." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b) (2002).

17

In this case, the arbitrator's award was derived from the Binding Arbitration
Agreement which set forth the matter submitted to him as "Underinsured Motorist
Claim-Damages." Several Utah cases are instructive on this issue. "'It is . . .
fundamental that the authority of the arbitrator springs from the agreement to arbitrate."'
Buzas Baseball. 925 P.2d at 949. "The proper test under exceeding authority ground is
'whether the arbitrator exceeded the powers delegated to him by the parties.'" Id. In
determining whether or not an arbitrator has exceeded his authority, the reviewing court
looks at the arbitration agreement to determine the scope of the dispute. See Pacific
Development v. Orton. 2001 UT 36, fl 1, 23 P.3d 1035.
Importantly, in reviewing an arbitrator's award, this court noted the policies
that govern this review. "Parties contemplating arbitration must be assured that the
arbitration will proceed according to established standards that both sides deem to be fair
and just." L± at |12. Furthermore, this court discussed: "The parties must know the
boundaries of the subject matter of the dispute submitted and the potential liabilities
flowing therefrom before they are able to intelligently waive their rights to submit their
disputes to formal litigation." Id. at ^[13.
In Orton, defendant made a similar argument to Wong in this appeal
regarding the scope of arbitration and the evidence presented. In Orton, defendant argued
18

that evidence was presented beyond the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement and
the presentation of this evidence modified the scope of the arbitration. See id. at ffi[8-14.
In rejecting this argument, this court explained that the arbitration agreement was
essentially a contract which could only be modified in writing. See id. at ^ 11. This court
enforced the original scope of the arbitration agreement, stating: "To allow modification
of an express written agreement by less than a similarly explicit intent would simply
circumvent the statutory requirements and the policies they vindicate." Id. at |14.
Although not the model of clarity, the arbitrator's Binding Arbitration
Agreement did set forth the scope of the arbitration-a UIM claim. As such, Allstate
entered the arbitration with the understanding the scope of Wong's ultimate recovery, as a
opposed to an assessment of what his total damages might be, was limited to his policy
limits. Allstate did not introduce the policy limits at the arbitration because the parties
agreed not to do so. At all times, Allstate understood that the arbitrator's award was
subject to the policy limits of Wong's UIM policy. (R. at 16-17,18, 57, 58).
As support for his argument that the district court acted improperly in
modifying the award, Wong cites a series of Colorado decisions. A careful reading of
these opinions, however, supports Allstate's arguments. Specifically, the Colorado
opinions, like Buzas, Soft Solutions and Orton, turn on the scope of the arbitration
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agreement and whether or not the parties had an agreement to disclose the policy limits to
the arbitrator. See Kutch v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co.. 960 P.2d 93 (Colo. 1998) (en
banc) (holding insurer's failure to timely appeal award barred defense of policy limits);
Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Tavlor. 45 P.3d 759 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (finding arbitration
agreement specifically granted arbitrator authority to determine amount of recovery under
policy and no agreement existed preventing insurer from presenting evidence of policy
limits at arbitration); Applehans v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 68 P.3d 594 (Colo. Ct. App.
2003) (remanding case for determination of whether agreement not to present policy
limits was present and requiring award be vacated if parties agreed not to present policy
limits at arbitration). Like the Utah opinions, Colorado looks at the scope of the issue
submitted and the parties' agreements regarding the evidence submitted.
Finally, other courts faced with this issue have similarly held that an
arbitrator exceeds his authority in making an award in excess of the insurance policy
limits. See, e.g., Brijmohan v. State Farm Insurance Coverage, 239 A.D.2d 496, 496-97
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (providing arbitration award in excess of amount available under
automobile liability policy is subject to vacatur as an award in excess of arbitrator's
powers); Mele v. General Accident Insurance Company, 198 A.D.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (concluding that arbitrators lacked authority to make award in excess of policy
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limits); State Farm Insurance Company v. Credle, 228 A.D.2d 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(award made in excess of the contractual limits of an insurance policy is an action in
excess of authority); Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Straw, 293 N.W.2d
704, 705 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming trial court's decision to "vacate[] that portion
of the award which exceeded the $20,000 policy limit of defendant's insurance as an
unlawful exercise by the arbitrators of equity jurisdiction"); Bernard v. Detroit
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 350 N.W.2d 847, 851 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding arbitrators committed error of law by not giving effect to insurance policy
provision, thereby exceeding their powers, and arbitration award should have been
vacated). This point is also made clear in Couch on Insurance 3d, wherein it states: "An
award which renders relief in excess of that allowed by the policy exceeds the power of
the arbitrator." Couch on Insurance 3d, §213:40.
Moreover, this is true even if the issue of policy limits was not before the
arbitrator. See Couch on Insurance 3d, §213:40, FN3; see also Meade v. Lumbermens
Mutual Casualty Company, 423 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1982) (holding where policy limits
were not issue in the arbitration, insurer could raise limits as defense to award exceeding
policy limits notwithstanding fact award was not challenged within statutorily prescribed
time); Kutch, 960 P.2d at 98 (providing that where both parties elected to withhold
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information as to the policy limits from the arbitrator, insurer could have filed motion to
vacate award on theory that arbitration panel exceeded its powers).
In the alternative, the district court also properly determined that the award
was without foundation in reason or fact. "This second prong is referred to as the
'irrationality principle' and is based on the 'assumption .. . that the parties, by their
agreement to arbitrate, have given the arbitrator the authority to decide their dispute on a
rational basis.'" Soft Solutions, 2000 UT 46 at f 11. On this point, the district court noted
that policy limits are contractual determinations as to what the parties are being insured
against and to suggest that somehow this is changed by simply submitting the matter to
arbitration makes no sense in logic or reason. (R. at 156, p.25)
In summary, the cases look at the scope of the matter submitted to the
arbitrator and any agreements the parties have made prior to entering into the arbitration.
In this case, the parties had a contract clearly limiting Wong's entitlement to UIM
benefits at $100,000. The amount Wong was entitled to recover under this policy was
submitted to the arbitrator. Prior to the arbitration, the parties agreed that the policy limits
would not be disclosed to the arbitrator. Allstate reaffirmed, however, that any award
would be subject to the policy limits. When the award came back in excess of the
contractual limits, Allstate tendered the contractual limits to Wong.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING THE
AFFIDAVIT OF THE ALLSTATE ADJUSTER AND THE
DECLARATIONS PAGE OF THE APPLICABLE INSURANCE POLICY.
By failing to object at the district court, Wong waived his right to argue the

district court acted improperly by considering extrinsic evidence. Wong argues that the
district court committed error in considering extrinsic evidence to conclude that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority. Specifically, Wong argues that the district court should
not have considered anything outside the arbitration agreements themselves, i.e., the UIM
policy terms established through the Affidavit of the Allstate adjuster and the declarations
page of the applicable insurance policy.2 This court, however, should not address this
issue because Wong failed to preserve it for appeal and has not provided any analysis as
to why this court should address it despite that failure. Furthermore, both parties agree
that the subject matter of the arbitration was Wong's entitlement to UIM benefits, and
therefore the UIM policy and limits were central to any determination of a final award or
judgment in favor or Mr. Wong.
2

On appeal, however, the bulk of Wong's argument is that Allstate waived its
right to assert the policy limits as a defense as evidenced by the parties' Arbitration
Agreement. Like the UIM policy, however, the Arbitration Agreement was not
introduced to arbitrator, and therefore, the Agreement would also be "extrinsic" to the
what the arbitrator recognized as the source and scope of his authority. The only
document which was disclosed to the arbitrator was the Binding Arbitration Agreement
which the arbitrator provided to the parties.
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Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires Wong either to cite to
the record "showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court," or provide "a
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A & B). In addition, Rule 24 mandates that Wong's "argument shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9) (emphasis added).
The case law on this issue is also well recognized. As a general rule, claims
not raised before the district court may not be raised on appeal. See State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74, Ifl 1, 10 P.3d 346; Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996);
State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, T[9, 46 P.3d 230. The two policy reasons supporting this rule
are:

(1) to give the district court an opportunity to address the claimed error and correct

it if necessary; and (2) a party should not forego making an objection with the strategy of
enhancing its chances for success and then, if the strategy fails, claim on appeal that the
court should reverse. See Cram, 2002 UT 37 at ^ 10. As this court has indicated on
numerous occasions, a party is "'not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial
and the benefit of objecting on appeal.'" Id. (quotation omitted).
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"However, three exceptions to this general rule are recognized in Utah. An
appellate court may address an issue for the first time on appeal if appellant establishes
that the trial court committed 'plain error,' if there are 'exceptional circumstances,' or in
some situations, if a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on appeal even
though, by reason of the claimed ineffectiveness, the matter was not raised below." State
v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Wong fails to address where this issue was preserved for appeal. Because
Wong failed to raise the issue before the district court or argue any exception to the
preservation rule in his original brief, he has now waived the right to have this court
address the issue. See Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ^9,17 P.3d
1125 (because plaintiff had not properly raised three issues in the district court that he
raised on appeal, and because he argued plain error or manifest injustice for the first time
in his reply brief, the court refused to review the three issues). Accordingly, this court
should apply Rule 24 and decline to address Wong's arguments regarding the district
court's consideration of extrinsic evidence in modifying the arbitration award.
Even if, however, this court were to consider Wong's argument on this
point, it is clear that the district court did not err in considering the evidence it did at the
hearing. In particular, the district court appropriately considered the fact that there was a
$100,000 limit in the insurance policy, as the underlying claim was contractual in nature.
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In other words, any money owed to Wong was based on a contractual obligation under the
insurance policy and thus it was proper for the district court to determine the basis of the
claim in examining whether to vacate or modify the arbitrator's award. This is especially
true given the fact that the Binding Arbitration Agreement listed the nature of the dispute
simply as "Underinsured Motorist Claim-Damages." Thus, by the very nature of the
dispute the arbitrator exceeded his authority in making an award in excess of the
applicable policy limits and the district court properly considered those limits in
modifying the award. It may have been appropriate for the arbitrator to determine the
value of Mr. Wong's personal injuries without being aware of the contract terms, but the
arbitrator had no authority to enter a UIM contract award for that same amount, without
referencing the insurance policy limits. The arbitrator knew this dispute to be a UIM
dispute, so after determining total personal injury damages, he was obligated to conform
his net award to the policy limits.
III.

WONG SHOULD NOT RECEIVE AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.
Wong finally contends on appeal that he should be awarded attorney fees

under Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-16 (2002), which provides that "[c]osts incurred incident
to any motion authorized by this chapter, including a reasonable attorney's fee, unless
precluded by the arbitration agreement, may be awarded by the court." kL In this case,
given the fact that the district court properly modified the arbitrator's award, attorney fees

are clearly not appropriate in favor of Wong. Even if, however, this court determines that
the district court should not be affirmed, attorney fees should still not be awarded given
that they are not allowed by contract and the statute does not mandate them. Accordingly,
this court should deny Wong's request for attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
As set forth in the foregoing arguments, the district court properly
recognized the nature of the parties' contractual agreements in modifying the arbitrator's
award. On appeal, Wong is trying to get a better outcome than the contract, which he
knowingly entered, allows him to recover. The district court properly recognized the
arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding an amount which in essence rewrites the
parties' contractual obligations and understandings.
DATED this

0> day of D(JtcL*>C

,2003.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

L/NN S. DA VIES
/ZACHARY E. PETERSON
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee

/
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Preston L. Handy
Dustin Lance
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5664 South Green Street
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Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant
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BERTCH ROBSON
1996 East 6400 South, Suite 100
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Warren W. Driggs
Mediation Services
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Via Facsimile Transmission to- 288-9414
Leonard E. McGee. Esq.
Stegall & xAssociates
6056 Fashion Square Drive, Suite 200
Murray. Utah 84107
RE:

Dixon Wong v. Allstate

Dear Leonard:
This is a follow-up to our recent conversation this morning regarding my client, Dixon
Wong, and the upcoming arbitration. I want to confirm that our agreement pursuant to the
Arbitration Agreement is that this matter will be arbitrated with no consideration for a binding
high/low agreement. This is evidenced by the Arbitration Agreement signed by you well after
the amendments/changes were made. Furthermore, it is important to note that nothing in Mr.
Wong's contract of insurance with Allstate requires that he be bound by a high/low agreement.
We have agreed that the arbitrator will not be made aware of either the terms of the
Arbitration Agreement or the policy limits under the subject policy. In short, the arbitrator will
be afforded the opportunity to award what he believes Mr. Wong's claim is worth, vvhatever that
figure may be.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

V

Stegall & Associates
Staff Counsel for A llsime Insurance Company
and Encompass Insurance

6056 Fashion Square Dr ,
Ste. 200,
Murray, UT 84107

William A. StcgaO, Esq.
Leonard E. McGte, Esq,

801-281-3 788 Phonn
801-288-9414 Fax

May 15, 2002
fVIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION)
266-1338&
Preston L. Handy, Esq.
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5684 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84J23
Re:

Wong v. Allstate Insurance
Court Case No.

Dear Mr. Handy;
F am in receipt of your letter dated May 14, 2002 regarding the above case.
I agree with you that there is not a high/low agreement in place regarding the upcoming
arbitration in this matter; however, it is Allstate Insurance Company's position (as it has been
from the beginning of this case) that Mr. Wong is still bound by the $100,000.00 contractual
limit of his insurance policy, notwithstanding whatever amount the arbitrator may award.
After a review of Dr. Howe's report, I have been authorized to extend an offer of
$70,000.00, new money, to settle Mr. Wong's claim. Please Jet me know your client's
response to this latest offer.
Sincerely,
STEGALL & ASSOCIATES

Leonard E. McGee
LEM.:rih

